Credentials for Smart Objects

Itappearsverydifficultfortheindustrytoagreeononetypeofcredentialtype for!all!sorts!of!deployments.!It!is!expected!that!fragmentation!similar!to!the!on...

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Credentials  for  Smart  Objects:  A  Challenge  for  the  Industry       Alper  Yegin   Samsung  Electronics   Workshop  on  Smart  Object  Security   March  23,  2012     Paris           One  of  the  most  challenging  areas  about  designing  smart  objects  and  their   networks  is  security.  On  one  hand,  smart  objects  can  be  extremely  constrained  -­‐-­‐   low  processing  and  battery  power,  low  memory,  lack  of  user  a  interface.  On  the   other  hand,  this  cannot  be  an  excuse  for  them  to  have  less  security  than  any   other  device  on  the  Internet.  Smart  objects  can  be  assuming  very  critical  roles,   such  as  monitoring  as  part  of  a  home  security  system,  or  controlling  as  part  of  an   intelligent  transportation  system.  Compromise  of  such  devices  can  be  more   catastrophic  than  compromise  of  a  typical  device  on  the  Internet,  such  as  a  PC,  or   a  mobile  phone.       Security  design  begins  with  the  selection  of  credential  types.  These  are  the   credentials  that  will  be  used  by  the  smart  objects  for  getting  authorized  for   network-­‐layer  access  and  then  for  application-­‐layer  access.  Certificates,   id/password  pairs,  and  UICCs  are  the  possible  choices  being  considered  in  the   industry.  Each  one  of  these  credential  types  has  their  own  advantages  and   disadvantages.  Id/password  pairs  are  relatively  light-­‐weight  when  considered  in   small  deployments,  yet  managing  them  in  large  numbers  is  not  practical.   Certificates  provide  a  robust  and  well-­‐established  solution  for  large-­‐scale   deployments,  but  their  added  cost  and  dependency  on  third  parties  (CA  vendors)   are  concerning  to  the  service  providers.  UICCs  are  attractive,  especially  to  3GPP   operators,  but  they  are  applicable  to  only  a  subset  of  deployments.  Furthermore,   they  add  to  the  cost  of  smart  objects.     The  procedure  to  provision  the  devices  with  such  credentials  depends  on  the   type  of  the  credential.  Id/password  pairs  can  be  provisioned  by  the   manufacturer  and  passed  on  to  the  service  provider  who  would  be  managing  the   devices.  Certificates  can  be  provisioned  by  the  manufacturer,  and  optionally   overwritten  by  the  service  provider  with  another  certificate.  In  addition  to  the   device  certificate,  one  or  more  root  CA  certificates  need  to  be  provisioned  on  the   device  as  well.  Selection  of  the  Root  CA  vendor  is  an  issue  for  the  device   manufacturer,  as  the  same  selection  shall  also  be  made  by  the  service  providers   using  those  devices.  Devices  changing  service  providers  may  require  re-­‐ provisioning  procedure,  which  also  impacts  the  choice  of  credential  type.  For   example,  id/password-­‐based  credentials  cannot  be  kept  the  same  once  the   device  changes  hands.      

It  appears  very  difficult  for  the  industry  to  agree  on  one  type  of  credential  type   for  all  sorts  of  deployments.  It  is  expected  that  fragmentation  similar  to  the  one   in  general  Internet  will  be  seen  for  the  smart  objects,  and  application-­‐specific   (i.e.,  vertical)  profiling  will  be  needed  in  order  to  narrow  down  the  possibilities   and  achieve  interoperability.  As  an  example,  ETSI  M2M  Architecture  [1][2]   supports  a  variety  of  credential  types  –  X.509  certificates,  PSKs,  UICCs,  and   anything  that  can  be  supported  by  an  EAP  method.     Secure  service  provider  discovery  and  service-­‐specific  provisioning  is  another   challenge.  Lack  of  a  human  user  behind  the  device  and  difficulty  in  pre-­‐ configuring  large  number  of  devices  make  it  difficult  for  device-­‐initiated   discovery  and  selection  mechanisms.  There  is  no  equivalent  of  a  user  interfacing   with  the  device  to  select  an  SSID,  operator  ID,  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  network-­‐ initiated  discovery  and  selection  mechanism  leads  to  device  ownership  problems   (i.e.,  how  would  the  device  know  that  it  shall  really  be  used  by  that  particular   service  provider  contacting  it?).       Dealing  with  one  set  of  credentials  is  already  difficult.  Dealing  with  multiple   credentials  due  to  the  separation  of  network  access  service  and  application   access  service  is  even  harder.  Therefore,  using  the  same  credential  for  both  types   of  access  seems  unavoidable.  Furthermore,  single  sign  on  schemes  are  being   considered  as  additional  optimization  tools.  As  an  example,  ETSI  M2M   Architecture  supports  use  of  UICC  for  both  the  network-­‐layer  and  application-­‐ layer  access.     Architecturally,  the  network  access  service  provider  (e.g.,  3/4G,  fixed  broadband   operator)  and  the  application  service  provider  who  manages  the  devices  for  a   specific  use  (e.g.,  smart  grid)  don't  have  to  be  the  same.  Nevertheless,  former   type  sees  this  as  an  opportunity  to  expand  its  business,  hence  prepares  to  act  as   an  integrated  service  provider.  Some  of  the  designs  are  getting  influenced  by  that   aspect  (e.g.,  use  of  UICC  for  both  of  the  services).     Finally,  smart  objects  are  expected  to  surround  our  daily  lives.  Our  activities  will   be  closely  monitored  and  reported  by  them.  Unless  proper  measures  are  put  in   place,  our  personal  privacy  will  be  in  a  much  bigger  danger  than  before.  Hiding   the  real  identities  from  neighboring  elements  and  even  intermediaries  will  be   essential.  Achieving  a  water-­‐proof  solution  for  the  constrained  smart  objects   presents  itself  as  another  challenge.       These  are  some  of  the  fundamental  challenges  faced  by  the  smart  object   architecture  designers.       References     [1] s_102690v010101p.pdf   [2] s_102921v010101p.pdf